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A CIRCUS AMONG THE CIRCUITS: WOULD THE TRULY FAMOUS 
AND DILUTED PERFORMER PLEASE STAND UP? THE FEDERAL 
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT AND ITS CHALLENGES 
 
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen* 
 
I. Introduction 
Sometimes, nothing is more painful than the truth. Congress passed the celebrated 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“the Act” or the “Dilution Act”) with great hope 
that it would create a uniform anti-dilution law, end forum shopping, and encourage 
trademark owners to build brand equity with more ease. Congress was overwhelmingly in 
favor the Act, and thus passed it with little debate, leaving behind a sparse congressional 
record. In its haste to pass the Act, Congress failed to address whether the Act extends to 
product design marks; whether the Act requires proof of actual economic harm, or if 
likelihood of dilution is an acceptable standard; how fame and dilution should be 
measured; and the degree of fame or dilution required under the Act. 
  
Trademark owners now have to bear the cost of congressional failure. For the time 
being, trademark owners are facing conflicting interpretations of the Dilution Act coming 
from the First, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The other circuit courts, expectedly, will 
soon follow suit when they have their chance to address the Act. Each of the circuit courts 
that has had the opportunity to address the Act has its own idea about dilution and fame, the 
meaning of dilution, how to establish fame, and how to prove dilution. With the conflicting 
rulings from these circuits, there is a circus among the circuits. Each performer at the circus 
is carrying its own act leaving trademark owners a federal anti-dilution system that is 
almost as chaotic as the original patchwork system of more than twenty-five state statutes. 
Trademark owners will continue to shop for a forum that has the best anti-dilution 
protection where the owners do not have to satisfy, among others, the stringent requirement 
of actual economic harm to the famous mark. 
  
*159 In Part I, this Article will expose the congressional failure. Part I also provides 
an analysis for each of the issues left out by Congress. These issues include: (a) the 
problems with providing a patent-like protection to product design marks under the Act; 
(b) the problems with proof of actual dilution versus likelihood of dilution; (c) the 
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problems with “famous;” and (d) the problems with undefined terms in the Act, such as 
“willful intent.” Part II analyzes, compares, and contrasts the dizzying circus acts of the 
First, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuit performers. Part III explains the reasons the fun at 
the circus is over and offers various ways to orchestrate a new act for the benefits of 
trademark owners, the courts and the public. Part IV concludes that if a uniform 
interpretation of the Act is not soon formulated by the circuit courts, more chaos will occur, 
and perhaps it is time to hear from the ringmasters--the Supreme Court or Congress. 
  
II. A Quick Overview of the Dilution Act 
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act went into effect on January 16, 1996, 
providing a federal remedy to dilution of famous marks. The Act amends section 43 of the 
Trademark Act of 1946, commonly known as the Lanham Act, to provide owners of 
famous marks with injunctive relief1 against unauthorized use of a mark that dilutes the 
distinctive quality of the famous mark.2 The Act adds a new subsection 43(c)(1) to the 
Lanham Act: 
 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon 
such terms as the court deems reasonable, to any injunction against another person’s 
commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after *160 the 
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous 
mark ...3 
   
The Act amends section 45 with a definition of dilution. The new definition states that 
dilution is “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods 
or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of 
the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”4 
  
The new subsection 43(c)(2) of the Act provides remedies set forth in sections 35 
and 36 of the Lanham Act. These remedies include damages and attorneys’ fees to a 
                                                             
1 Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1996). 
2 Other provisions of the Lanham Act § 43 provide a cause of action for owners of 
marks, regardless of whether the marks are registered, against unauthorized use that causes 
false representation, association, sponsorship, advertisement or unfair competition. See 15 
U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B); see also Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair 
Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. 
Rev. 671, 704 (1984). 
3 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 
(1996), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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plaintiff if it is shown that the defendant “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s 
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark.” The Act and its legislative history are 
silent on the definition of “willfully intended.” 
  
Under subsection 43(c)(1), not every mark is entitled to anti-dilution protection; the 
Act protects only famous marks.5 The Act provides eight non-exclusive factors for courts 
to consider in determining whether a mark is “distinctive and famous”: (A) the degree of 
inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of the 
mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the 
duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of 
the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or 
services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the 
trading areas and channels of trade used by the mark’s owner and the person against whom 
the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by 
third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or 
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the Principal Register.6 
  
Since the Act is intended to provide protection against “commercial use” of a mark, 
the Act exempts certain types of fair use of a mark from a dilution claim. Subsection (c)(4) 
provides examples of fair use of a mark: using a mark in *161 comparative commercial 
advertisement, noncommercial use of a mark, and news reporting and commentary.7 
  
III. A Circus Created by Congressional Ill-Thought Legislation 
In March of 1995, Representative Carlos Moorhead of California introduced a bill 
to amend the Lanham Act to protect famous marks from dilution--the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995.8 The Act was passed with a strong reception from Congress and with 
sparse legislative history.9 
  
In passing the bill, Congress was aware of the problems associated with 
anti-dilution laws in twenty-five states. The “patchwork system” of state laws imposed 
difficulties on owners of trademarks to build national brand awareness and management 
                                                             
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4). 
8 See H.R. 1295, 104th Cong. (1995). 
9 See 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S19,312 
(daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (the Senate passed the bill without debate). 
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and encouraged forum shopping for states that offered the most favorable protection.10 In 
addition, state laws lacked uniformity in the application of dilution theory.11 
  
Unfortunately, in its haste to pass the Act, Congress either was silent or failed to 
provide in-depth discussion on issues such as (1) whether the Act applies to all marks, 
including product configuration or design; (2) the meaning of dilution, and how dilution 
must be demonstrated; (3) the meaning of “famous” and how “famous” is measured; and 
(4) what types of conduct amount to willful intent, and whether remedies against such 
conduct require proof of actual harm suffered by the famous mark, which has now become 
less famous than it was before dilution. As demonstrated below, failure to address these 
issues raises potential threats to the *162 constitutionality of the Act, causes 
inconsistencies in the application of dilution theories, and creates a circus among the 
circuits. 
  
A. The Problems of Perpetual Patent-Like Protection: The Dilution Act and Product 
Design 
An examination of the plain language of the Dilution Act suggests that the Act 
applies to a famous “mark” and does not restrict the definition of that term to word marks.12 
Thus, without such a restriction, an argument could be made that the Act applies to all 
marks including product design marks.13 This interpretation, however, raises a potential 
constitutional problem: the Act potentially provides perpetual federal protection to a 
product design which is normally subject to limited time protection under the federal patent 
law.14 
  
 
                                                             
10 See 141 Cong. Rec. H14,318 (daily ed. Dec 12, 1995). 
11 See Hearing on H.R. 1270, The “Madrid Protocol Implementation Act of 1995” 
and H.R. 1295, the “Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995” Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 
121-23 (1996) (statement of Thomas E. Smith, Section of Intellectual Property Law, 
American Bar Association). 
12 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 1998). 
13 Id. at 45. 
14 In I.P. Lund, Kohler challenged the constitutionality of the Dilution Act as 
applies to product designs in violation of the federal patent law. Id. at 50. See also Stephen 
K. Marsh, Recent Development, Patents Are Forever: Construing the Federal Trademark 
Dilution Act to Apply to Product Configurations in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West 
Bend Co., 4 J. Intell. Prop. L. 412 (1997). 
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Since the Dilution Act is designed to benefit only the owners of the famous marks 
and not the general public at large, the Act does not require the owners to prove public 
confusion as to source.15 If Congress indeed intended to extend the reach of the Act to all 
product designs that are famous, then Congress was creating a perpetual patent grant to the 
famous product designs solely for the interest of the owner at the expense of the public.16 
Thus the public’s opportunity to benefit by purchasing similar products at a lower price is 
prevented as the Act allows the owner of the product design to hold a perpetual monopoly 
in the product design.17 
  
*163 Whether Congress intended the Act to cover product designs requires scrutiny 
in the spare legislative history and jurisprudence on patent and trademark conflicts. 
Legislative history of the Act provides examples of blurring and tarnishment only for word 
marks.18 There are no examples of dilution of product design or configuration. This could 
mean that Congress was cognizant that it is easy to understand dilution through blurring or 
tarnishment if the famous mark is a word mark, but not if it is a product design mark where 
the mark is the product itself.19 According to the First Circuit, in a product design mark 
case it is difficult to see how dilution through blurring or tarnishment can be shown where 
the defendant has replicated some aspects of a plaintiff’s product design, and the result is a 
defendant’s product that does not create consumer association between defendant’s 
product and plaintiff’s product design mark.20 
  
Moreover, in a dilution claim involving product design, often the real issue is not 
interference with the source identification function of the product design, but rather 
protection from appropriation of or free-riding on the investment that the plaintiff has made 
in its known product design.21 Such investment is usually given patent protection, which is 
limited in duration.22 
                                                             
15 I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 48. 
16 See Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the 
Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations, 5 J Intell. 
Prop. L. 415 (1998). 
17 See Id. See also Marsh, supra note 14. 
18 See H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st sess. 104 (1995). See also I.P. Lund, 
163 F.3d at 49-50. 
19 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See Marsh, supra note 14. 
Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
 
1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 158 
 
  
Accordingly, the First Circuit has recently insisted on a vigorous review of the 
product design in a dilution claim.23 Though that court believes that the Dilution Act does 
cover product designs, the court notes that there may be rare cases where Congress did not 
envision protection under the Act for a product design from dilution by a competing 
product.24 The court fears that a broad reading of the statute *164 allowing all forms of 
product designs protection under the Act would push it to the “constitutional edge” 
creating a conflict between patent and trademark law.25 
  
Some commentators have flatly suggested that Congress intended to categorically 
exclude product design from the protection provided under the Dilution Act.26 According 
to these commentators, traditional federal trademark infringement protection for a product 
design does not create a monopoly in the use of the design as long as that protection is 
based on the consumer confusion rationale.27 In that context, there is no conflict between 
patent and trademark laws.28 Outside the context of the traditional consumer confusion 
rationale, federal patent law preempts any protection for product design.29 Thus, blanket 
anti-dilution protection for product designs under Dilution Act would violate the federal 
patent law. A way to avoid such a violation is to exclude product design from the “mark” 
definition under the Dilution Act.30 
  
Such categorical exclusion, however, contradicts the plain language of the Dilution 
Act, which does not restrict the definition of “mark” to a word mark.31 The exclusion 
violates the statutory meaning of trademark, which includes not just words but symbols, 
designs, or devices.32 In addition, such exclusion would reduce a product design that has 
                                                             
23 I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 50. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. See also Marsh, supra note 14. 
26 Heald, supra note 16. 
27 Heald, supra note 16. See also Marsh, supra note 14. 
28 See Heald, supra note 16. 
29 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 154 (1989); 
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).#&160; See also Heald, supra note 
16. 
30 Heald, supra note 16. 
31 See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 50. 
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1996). 
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been functioning as a source identifier to a second class citizen status; it functions as a 
trademark within the meaning of the statute but does not have all the privileges and 
protection that all other trademarks currently enjoy. As demonstrated above, by passing the 
Dilution Act without addressing whether the *165 Act reaches all types of marks, Congress 
has created uncertainty where it envisioned resolution. 
 
B. The Problems of Dilution: Actual Economic Harm to the Selling Power of a Famous 
Mark or Likelihood of Dilution 
The plain language of the Act requires that (1) the plaintiff’s mark is famous; (2) 
the defendant’s use of the junior mark commencing after the plaintiff’s mark33 has become 
famous; and (3) the use of the junior mark causes a “lessening of the capacity of a famous 
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services.”34 The language of the Act seems 
simple, direct and clear; however, it is more deceptive than this simple reading. Indeed, the 
Act could be interpreted to require proof of actual dilution because the language of the Act 
refers to a junior mark used after the plaintiff’s mark becomes famous and then the junior 
mark causing dilution.35 The Act does not state that the use of the junior mark is likely to 
cause or will cause dilution to the famous mark. This reasoning leads to the question of 
what type of proof is required to show actual dilution. 
  
The Fourth Circuit, in addressing proof of dilution, has imposed a stringent 
requirement that actual economic harm be established by showing that the defendant’s use 
of the junior mark lessened the demand for the plaintiff’s products or services.36 The First 
Circuit, in a case involving a product design mark, has observed that the demand for a 
plaintiff’s products is always lessened whenever a competing product achieves a 
measurable degree of success.37 The fact that customers knowingly choose to pay less for a 
similar product instead of paying more for a more famous product does not in and of itself 
establish dilution through blurring. 38  According to the First Circuit, dilution through 
blurring has to do with *166 the identification of a product, and that is not the same thing as 
                                                             
33 A junior mark is a mark that is used after the plaintiff’s mark has become 
famous. 
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
35 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). 
36 See Id. 
37 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48 (1st Cir. 1998). 
38 Id. at 49. 
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a lessening of demand. 39  Nevertheless, questions remain regarding whether the Act 
requires proof of actual dilution or likelihood of dilution, and regarding what is an 
acceptable degree of dilution.40 A district court has also addressed proof of dilution by 
relying on a consumer survey, which shows that 21% consumers in the geographical areas 
where the defendant operated its convenience stores associated the defendant’s mark with 
the plaintiff’s.41 
  
The Fourth Circuit has recently held, however, that such proof of “association” 
between the defendant’s mark and the plaintiff’s mark does not address the heart of actual 
dilution.42 Because the Act does not provide any example or guidance on what dilution 
means and how dilution can be shown, that Act essentially leaves open a wide range of 
interpretations, including an extreme interpretation of actual dilution imposed by the 
Fourth Circuit.43 The Fourth Circuit has held that proof of actual dilution is shown by 
evidence of actual economic harm to the selling power of the famous mark due to the use of 
the junior mark by the defendant.44 In other words, the use of defendant’s mark lessened 
the demand for *167 the plaintiff’s products or services in a measurable way.45 The court 
offered three means for demonstrating actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling 
power: (1) actual loss of revenues; (2) contextual factors such as the junior mark’s 
exposure, the similarity of the marks, and the firmness of the senior mark’s hold; and (3) 
consumer survey.46 
                                                             
39 Id. 
40 The court in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah 
Div. Of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 612, aff’d, 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter 
Ringling II], commented that “the Act does not specify how dilution occurs or how it may 
be detected or measured.” The court suggests that “[b]ecause the effect of blurring may 
manifest itself directly in harm to the selling power of the famous mark, dilution by 
blurring may be shown by proof that the use of a junior mark has caused a lessening of 
demand for the product or services bearing the famous mark or for use of the famous mark 
in co-promotions” or dilution via blurring may be shown “by the direct evidence of a 
survey of consumers and indirectly or circumstantially by the application of [the Mead 
Data] multi-factor balancing test”). 
41 WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
42 Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453. 
43 See Id. at 459-61. 
44 See Id. at 461. 
45 See Id. 
46 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 465 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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The proof of actual loss of revenues is very rare and difficult to obtain.47 Because 
dilution is a slow process, it would take years for the owner of a famous mark to be able to 
quantify the actual loss of revenues due to the diminishment of the selling power of the 
famous mark.48 Further, waiting for enough evidence to be quantifiable may cause the 
owner of the famous mark to foreclose his opportunity to get preliminary injunctive relief 
from the defendant. 
  
The proof of “the extent of the junior mark’s exposure, the similarity of the marks, 
and the firmness of the senior mark’s hold”49 is irrelevant, redundant and not helpful. 
Although dilution through blurring more likely occurs if the junior mark is strong and has 
independent image and reputation, “the extent of the junior mark’s exposure” is not 
relevant in cases where the junior mark triggers no recollection or thought of the famous 
mark.50 “The similarity of the marks” is not helpful because dilution can occur in cases 
such as parody or tarnishment where the junior mark may not be very similar to the famous 
mark.51 Furthermore, the Dilution Act does not require the junior mark to be similar to the 
famous mark.52 “The firmness of the *168 senior mark’s hold” is a redundancy of the 
“fame” analysis53 because the Dilution Act only protects marks that are famous. A dilution 
analysis is not necessary if the fame analysis reveals that the mark is not famous within the 
meaning of the Dilution Act.54 
  
The third type of proof requires a “consumer survey designed not just to 
demonstrate mental association of the marks in isolation, but further consumer impressions 
                                                             
47 See Id. 
48 See Thomas McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §§ 
24:90, 24:94, 160-61 (4th ed. 1997). 
49 See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 465. 
50 McCarthy, § 24:94.1, 24-165. 
51 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp 1183, 1190-91 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (ENJOY COCAINE and COCA-COLA) 
52 See Lanham Act §43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1996). 
53 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (the Dilution Act protects only famous marks; thus, 
the fame analysis must take place prior to the dilution analysis. Therefore, it is redundant to 
analyze the fame of the senior mark again in the dilution analysis). 
54 See 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(c). See also Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. 
Supp. 500, 519-21 (M.D.Pa. 1998). 
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from which actual harm and cause might rationally be inferred.”55 The third type of proof 
seems plausible; however, the Fourth Circuit failed to address the degree of actual harm 
that the consumer survey must show in order for the plaintiff to meet its evidentiary 
burden. 56  Specifically, what percentage of “dilution” in the consumer survey is an 
acceptable threshold of dilution?57 
  
On the other end of the spectrum, a “likelihood of dilution” standard dominates a 
dilution analysis. Courts that apply this standard often use a modified Mead Data test that 
was originally formulated by Judge Sweet ten years ago in his concurring opinion in Mead 
Data Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales.58 The original Mead *169 Data test included balancing 
the factors: (1) similarity of the marks; (2) similarity of the products; (3) sophistication of 
the consumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6) renown of the 
junior mark.59 The modified Mead Data test eliminates the “similarity of the products” and 
“predatory intent” factors because those factors belong to the traditional likelihood of 
confusion analysis and thus they are not appropriate in a dilution analysis. A modified 
Mead Data test, as argued by several commentators, is significant because it allows an 
owner of a famous mark to seek preliminary injunctive relief from a defendant who has yet 
to market its dissimilar products with a junior mark that is similar to the famous mark.60 
  
In summary, with sparse congressional record providing guidance in order to 
                                                             
55 See Ringling at 465. 
56 Patrick Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 295 (1999). 
57  See Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 
Franchise L. J. 111 (1998). 
58 Many courts continue to use Judge Sweet’s concurring opinion in Mead Data 
Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989), which 
Judge Sweet used for interpreting the New York anti-dilution statute to analyze dilution 
through blurring. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 519-21 (M.D. 
Pa. 1998); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 1999 WL 47313 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1999); 
Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Ringling Bros.-Barnum Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division 
of Travel Development, 955 F. Supp. 605, 615-16 (E.D. Va. 1997); WAWA v. Haaf, 40 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 
59 See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1035. 
60 See Bible, supra note 56. 
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consistently interpret the meaning of dilution and proof of dilution, the Dilution Act creates 
a problem that Congress intended to correct: forum shopping for courts within a circuit that 
has the most favorable and broadest protection. Trademark owners now would avoid courts 
in the Fourth Circuit so that they do not have to demonstrate actual economic harm suffered 
by the famous marks! 
  
C. The Problems with “Famous” 
“Famous” is an amorphous concept. It is difficult to determine whether a mark is 
famous, how much fame a famous mark needs, and whether a famous mark is more famous 
than another famous mark.61 The Dilution Act requires that only famous marks are entitled 
to federal anti-dilution protection; however, the Act is of no assistance in resolving how 
famous a mark should be in order for it to enjoy its protection.62 The Act provides a list of 
eight non-exclusive factors for courts to *170 analyze to determine whether a mark is 
famous; however, that list fails to quantify the fame of a mark.63 Further, if a mark is found 
famous, does it follow that the degree of fame the mark possesses should correlate with the 
extent of protection it should receive? 
  
In analyzing whether a mark is famous within the context of the Act, courts have 
held that it is not sufficient that a mark has acquired secondary meaning.64 The question 
then would be whether such a mark could ever be accorded a status of famous. If the 
answer is no, here lays the pitfall of trademark law: a mark that has acquired secondary 
meaning would always be treated as a second class citizen compared to a mark that is 
inherently distinctive or suggestive. 
  
Thus, it is not surprising that some courts have erroneously found famous a number 
of marks that are only known and recognized within a particular industry.65 These cases 
often involve domain names on the Internet. In the Internet cases, it seems that the courts 
are willing to find a plaintiff’s mark famous, and that a defendant’s use of the mark as a 
                                                             
61 See Miles J. Alexander, Dilution Basics, in Dilution and Famous Marks for 
Advanced Trademark Practitioners: Course Materials, March 5, 1998 (discussion on some 
limitations of the Act); Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution’s Entry Into Federal 
Trademark Law, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 215 (1997) (discussion on “famous” and its 
effects on average business owners). 
62 See Alexander, supra note 61; Serad, supra note 61. 
63 Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1) (1996). 
64 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998). 
65 See, e.g., Teletech Customer Care Management, Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., Inc., 977 
F. Supp. 1407, 1413 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 
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domain name amounts to dilution.66 This indicates that the courts want to accommodate 
congressional desire to curb the use of deceptive domain names.67 This poses a threat to a 
uniform application of the Act; some marks are not qualified to get the protection but are 
accorded such protection *171 simply because the use of the marks involves the Internet! 
Additionally, in the non-Internet area, some courts find marks to be famous that enjoy very 
little fame outside their narrowly defined markets.68 
  
D. The Problems with the Undefined Term “Willfully Intended” 
In an unexpected twist of fate, the Dilution Act’s undefined term “willfully 
intended” has acquired a new meaning in a recent Fourth Circuit’s decision.69 The Fourth 
Circuit in Ringling examined the Dilution Act and held that “causes dilution” requires 
proof of actual economic harm because “cause” is not “will” or “may.”70 The Fourth 
Circuit found support for its ruling by contrasting the state dilution laws and the Dilution 
Act. It noted that unlike state dilution statutes that only focus on future harm by providing 
only injunctive relief, the federal statute focuses on consummated actual economic harm 
suffered by the famous mark. 71  According to the Fourth Circuit, evidence for the 
requirement of consummated actual economic harm is in the remedy provision against 
“willful intend”.72 Since the Act provides monetary and restitutionary damages against a 
                                                             
66 See Panavision International v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming the district court’s finding that dilution occurs when “potential customers of 
[plaintiff] will be discouraged if they cannot find its web page by typing in 
‘Panavision.com,’ but instead are forced to wade through hundreds of web sites.”); Jews 
for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 306-07 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding dilution occurs 
when “[p]rospective users of plaintiff’s services who mistakenly access defendant’s web 
site may fail to continue to search for plaintiff’s own home page, due to anger, frustration 
or the belief that plaintiff’s home page does not exist.”); Teletech, 977 F. Supp. at 1410 
(finding that use of a search engine can generate as many as 1,000 matches and it is “likely 
to deter web browsers from searching for Plaintiff’s particular web site”). 
67 See Reichman, supra note 57. 
68 Gazette Newpapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (D.Md. 1996); 
Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995 (S.D. Fla. 1997). 
69 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999). 
70 Id. at 460-61. 
71 Id. at 458, 460. 
72 Id. at 461. 
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defendant who “willfully intended to trade on the owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of 
the famous mark,” it follows that the Act requires only proof of actual economic harm 
suffered by the famous mark.73 Under the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning, “causes dilution” 
becomes “caused dilution” and “willful intent” has become “consummated economic 
harm”! 
  
On the other hand, a different interpretation of the Dilution Act can be formulated 
such that the Act’s subsection (c)(2) simply provides different remedies *172 against 
different types of conduct committed by the defendant.74 If there is no willful intent then 
the remedy is limited to injunctive relief.75 If there is willful intent, then the remedy 
includes monetary and restitutionary relief.76 A narrow reading of the subsection inferring 
that the Act absolutely requires proof of actual economic harm to the famous mark, 
because there is the potential for monetary and restitutionary relief, is contrary to well 
established trademark jurisprudence. Trademark law has long provided that proof of 
likelihood of confusion is sufficient despite the fact that the Lanham Act allows for both 
equitable and legal remedies under section 35(a).77 
  
Moreover, section 35(a) provides remedies specific to trademark infringement or 
likelihood of confusion claims under section 43(a), not dilution claims under section 
43(c).78 The language of section 35(a) makes clear that only plaintiffs who own registered 
trademarks asserting trademark violation under the Lanham Act or who allege likelihood 
                                                             
73 Id. 
74 See Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996). 
75 See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1); Lanham Act § 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1996). 
76 See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(2). 
77 Courts use balancing factors in finding proof of likelihood of confusion. See, 
e.g., J&J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460 (Fed Cir. 1991); Piper 
Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984); Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. 
v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 
(1982)); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1979); James 
Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1976); Blockbuster 
Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Berkshire 
Fashions, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 725 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); McDonald’s Corp. v. 
McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); A.T. Cross Co. v. TPM Distrib., Inc., 
226 U.S.P.Q. 521 (D.C. Minn. 1985); Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 
816, 823-24 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
78 See Lanham Act § 35(a). 
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of confusion can obtain monetary damages.79 The plaintiff does not have to prove actual 
economic harm due to infringement or confusion of its mark under section 43(a). 80 
Similarly, Congress grants a plaintiff *173 who prevails in a dilution claim monetary 
remedies under section 35(a) which are identical to the remedies entitled to a plaintiff who 
prevails in a trademark infringement or likelihood of confusion claim. This suggests that 
Congress could have not intended section 43(c) to always require proof of actual dilution 
or actual economic harm.81 
  
In its eager haste to pass the Moorhead bill, Congress failed to address the issues 
noted above: perpetual patent-like protection, whether actual economic harm or likelihood 
of dilution is required, and the extent of fame a mark must possess. These issues have 
created a circus in place of the 25 clowns of the state statutes Congress originally wanted to 
eliminate. The problems will only proliferate until either the Supreme Court clarifies the 
meaning of the Dilution Act or Congress amends the Act with provisions to clarify the 
issues noted above. Thus, the Dilution Act has brought uncertainty where it had set out to 
resolve uncertainties. Once again, trademark owners are facing problems ranging from 
constitutional challenges, inconsistent application of dilution theories, differing 
interpretations of the Act, and the need for forum shopping. 
  
As demonstrated below, several circuit courts have had the opportunity to interpret 
the Dilution Act, and all of these courts seem to struggle with the concept of dilution. The 
end result so far is a circus of decisions that are more disjoined than the “patch work 
system” of state laws that existed before the enactment of the Dilution Act. Each performer 
at the circus has its own ideas of what dilution is and how to prove dilution. Yet all 
performers start out at the same point of origin: the language of the Dilution Act itself. The 
audience at the circus--trademark owners and practitioners--are experiencing nothing less 
than a dizzying performance. Perhaps the performance is getting too convoluted and is not 
well orchestrated. 
  
Below is a description of the various acts at the circus with critique. 
  
IV. A View of the Performances of the Circuits at the Circus 
A. The First Circuit: I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co. 
The First Circuit has recently addressed the standards of determining dilution and 
whether the Dilution Act applies to product designs in cases of first *174 impression for the 
                                                             
79 See Lanham Act § 35(a). 
80 See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1996). 
81 See Lanham Act § 43(c)(2). 
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Circuit. 82  In this case, the plaintiff was the Danish manufacturer of VOLA faucets 
designed by the noted architect Arne Jacobsen.83 The VOLA faucet is a single-control, 
wall-mounted faucet with a handle that utilizes a thin cylindrical lever to adjust water 
temperature and volume.84 The VOLA faucet has a spout and an aerator holder of uniform 
diameter with the spout bending downward at right angles softened by a curve. The VOLA 
faucet only fits no-hole sinks.85 The VOLA faucet has been on the market since 1969, has 
received numerous awards, and has been displayed in the Museum of Modern Art. The 
faucet has also been regularly advertised and featured in numerous magazines.86 
  
Defendant Kohler was the largest supplier of plumbing fixtures in the United 
States. In 1994, Kohler contacted plaintiff Lund regarding the possibility of selling VOLA 
faucets under Kohler’s name and subsequently bought eight VOLA faucets to test whether 
the faucets met U.S. regulations.87 Kohler gave a VOLA faucet to its industrial designer 
who studied the VOLA faucet and then designed the Falling Water faucet. Kohler’s Falling 
Water faucet contains most of the VOLA faucet features described above.88 Kohler’s 
Falling Water faucet is sold at lower price than the VOLA faucet.89 Co-defendant Robern, 
prior to being acquired by Kohler in 1995, sold VOLA faucets and used pictures with 
VOLA faucets to promote the sale of its sink modules.90 Robern continued to use the same 
pictures in its promotional materials, despite the fact that for sales it has replaced the 
VOLA faucets with the Falling Water faucets in its sink modules.91 Plaintiff Lund brought 
suit against *175 defendants Kohler and Robern for trade dress dilution and infringement. 
The district court entered preliminary injunction against the defendants on dilution claim, 
but not on the infringement claim. The defendants appealed.92 
  
                                                             
82 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1998). 
83 Id. at 34. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 32, 34. 
87 Id. at 34. 
88 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 1998). 
89 Id. at 34. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 35. 
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The First Circuit recognized from the outset that this case raised several questions 
of first impression in the circuit.93 The First Circuit noted that unlike traditional trademark 
and trade dress law, the Dilution Act is not concerned with consumer confusion or the 
public interest; 94  the Dilution Act protects only the owners of trademarks or trade 
dresses.95 The First Circuit stated that despite their different purposes, a claim for trade 
dress infringement and a claim for trade dress dilution share three elements before the 
analyses diverge: (1) the trade dress must be used in commerce; (2) the trade dress must be 
non-functional; and (3) the trade dress must be distinctive.96 The First Circuit held that the 
plaintiff in a dilution claim bears the burden of proving that its trade dress is 
non-functional. Non-functionality is essential because (a) this doctrine prevents a 
constitutional problem between trademark and patent law; (b) Congress could not have 
intended to provide Lanham Act protection to functional aspects of products--trademarks 
must serve their intended purpose of identifying product source; and (c) the doctrine deters 
a plaintiff from bringing unwarranted action since it is the plaintiff who must bear the 
burden of non-functionality.97 Thus, if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate non-functionality, 
there is no trade dress protection available under the Dilution Act.98 Accordingly, the First 
Circuit remanded the case for a finding on non-functionality, which the district court 
previously had failed to conduct.99 
  
*176 As to the fame prong of the analysis, the First Circuit held that that district 
court failed to apply the fame factors under the Dilution Act. 100  The district court 
erroneously concluded that the VOLA design is distinctive because it had acquired 
secondary meaning.101 Such a per se analysis is incorrect under the Dilution Act that 
requires a rigorous analysis of fame.102 The First Circuit found that the VOLA product 
design is an unregistered mark and not inherently distinctive, strong or nationally 
                                                             
93 Id. at 32. 
94 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1998). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 38. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 51. 
100 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47 (1st Cir. 1998). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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known.103 Thus, the VOLA product design has not achieved the level of fame required 
within the context of the Dilution Act. 
  
As to the dilution prong of the analysis, the First Circuit held that the district court’s 
standard for determining dilution through blurring was incorrect.104 The district court had 
articulated that the plaintiff must demonstrate that “the use of a junior mark has caused a 
lessening of demand for the product or services bearing the famous mark.”105 The First 
Circuit rejected the district court’s actual harm standard because “the demand for one 
product is almost always lessened whenever a competing product achieves a measurable 
degree of success.”106 A customer’s economic decision to knowingly choose to pay less 
for a similar product, balancing the trade off of lower price or greater fame does not 
establish dilution through blurring.107 According to the First Circuit, the correct standard 
for determining dilution through blurring is “whether target customers will perceive the 
products as essentially the same.” Thus, dilution through blurring “has to do with the *177 
identificationoof a product, and that is not the same thing as a lessening of demand.”108 
  
The First Circuit’s standard for determining dilution, however, is contrary to the 
Dilution Act and its legislative intent. The Dilution Act only protects famous marks from 
dilution, and to achieve the “famous” status within the meaning of the Dilution Act a mark 
must be recognized by a large segment of the public in a wide geographical area.109 Thus, 
                                                             
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 49. 
105 Id. This actual dilution standard was used by the district court in Ringling 
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. Of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 
605, 616 (E.D.Va. 1997), and was later adopted by the Fourth Circuit in the same case. See 
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). 
106 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 (1st Cir. 1998). 
107 Id. at 50. 
108 Id. at 33, 49-50. 
109 America OnLine, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D.Va. Nov. 10, 
1998) (stating that the ownership of a distinctive mark is required for a dilution claim under 
the Act); Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. The Hoover Co., 1998 WL 427595 *16 (N.D. Ill. July 
23, 1998) (“While these marks are registered and have been used for many years on 
products sold nationwide, Breuer/Tornado has provided little evidence that these marks 
have acquired a degree of recognition sufficient to be considered famous, particularly 
outside of the narrow market for commercial vacuums and floor cleaning”); Michael 
Caruso & Co., Inc. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1454, 1463 (S.D.Fla. 1998) 
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if a famous mark is diluted, it is the general public, not just “target customers,” which after 
being exposed to the junior mark and its products, associate the famous mark with the 
products bearing the junior mark.110 In addition, the First Circuit’s requirement that the 
plaintiff’s product and the defendant’s product must be perceived to be “essentially the 
same” has no place in a dilution analysis. Such a requirement is more appropriate with the 
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. The First Circuit essentially requires that in a 
dilution analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the consumer perceives the products 
as coming from the same source! This requirement contradicts the language of the Dilution 
Act and its legislative intent; there is no such requirement in the Act. In addition, the First 
Circuit decision ignores the fact that the definition of dilution under the Dilution Act is the 
“lessening of the capacity of a famous mark *178 to identify and distinguish goods or 
services.” The likely outcome of such actual dilution of the famous mark would be that the 
famous mark no longer has the reputation and prestige that it once enjoyed, and thus the 
demand for the products bearing the famous mark would be less than before the junior 
mark was used. 
  
The First Circuit, however, raised a serious constitutional issue relating to the reach 
of the Dilution Act. The First Circuit examined whether the Dilution Act protects product 
design or configuration. Though recognizing that the Dilution Act does not restrict the 
definition of “famous mark” to just word marks,111 the First Circuit observed that there is a 
fundamental problem in applying the dilution law to the product design in a case involving 
competing products.112 The First Circuit expressed its doubt that Congress intended the 
reach of the Dilution Act to extend to the designs of competing products because (a) 
dilution theories such as blurring and tarnishment can easily apply to word marks but are 
more difficult to apply to product design marks; (b) legislative history of the Dilution Act 
provides examples of blurring and tarnishment to word marks only; and (c) it is difficult to 
prove dilution of the source identifying function of a product design in a case where some 
of the product design is “partially replicated and the result is largely dissimilar and does not 
create consumer confusion.”113 The First Circuit even speculated that it is possible that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(“Even if a mark is distinctive in its particular market, [this] does not render it inherently 
distinctive so as to engender immediate recognition in the general public of a particular 
product”). One court found a plaintiff’s mark not famous though the mark has been in use 
and widely advertised for 46 years in connection with eight grocery stores, while another 
court found a plaintiff’s mark famous that has been in use for 90 years in connection with 
grocery chain stores in the Northeast region. See Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. 
Supp. 1030 (D. Hawai’i 1996); WAWA v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 
110 McCarthy, supra notes 48. 
111 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 1998). 
112 Id. at 49. 
113 Id. at 50. 
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Congress did not envision anti-dilution protection for product design against a competing 
product under the Dilution Act;114 however, the court recognized that the language of the 
Dilution Act does not permit a court to categorically deny such protection to product 
design.115 Nevertheless, “rare cases can be imagined.”116 Thus, the court refused to read 
the statute broadly for fear that such reading would bring the Circuit “to the constitutional 
edge” and require a “rigorous review” of product design cases under the Dilution Act.117 
  
*179 B. The Fourth Circuit: Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Division of Travel Development. 
Plaintiff Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey had been using the mark THE 
GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH in association with its circus since 1872. The plaintiff 
obtained a federal registration for its mark in 1961. 118  The plaintiff has extensively 
advertised and promoted its mark, and the budget for such marketing purposes was $19 
million for its most recent fiscal year.119 On average, more than 70 million people each 
year are exposed to the mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH in connection with 
plaintiff Ringling. 120  Revenues derived from goods and services bearing the mark 
exceeded $103 million for the most recent fiscal year. 121  To protect its mark from 
                                                             
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998). See also 
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (affirming an 
injunction on the infringement ground). In this case, plaintiff Sunbeam was the 
manufacturer of stand food mixers since 1930. The stand food mixer had its present design 
since 1979 and is named “the America Classic.” Defendant West Bend introduced its 
“Legend” stand mixer market, which closely resembled plaintiff’s stand mixer design. The 
defendant sold the Legend stand mixer for $20 less than the plaintiff’s product. The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringement and dilution. The district court entered an 
injunction in plaintiff’s favor on the infringement ground and alternatively held that an 
injunction would be appropriate against the defendant under the Dilution Act. The 
defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit on all grounds. 
118 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999). 
119 See Id. 
120 See Id. 
121 See Id. 
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unauthorized use, the plaintiff has expended a substantial effort to police the mark against 
third party use with an enforcement program. 122  On the other hand, defendant Utah 
Division of Travel Development, an agency of the State of Utah, used the mark THE 
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH in connection *180 with Utah tourism services since 
1962.123 The defendant, however, did not use its mark continuously; it ceased using the 
mark in 1963, 1977 and 1989.124 The plaintiff brought a dilution claim under the Dilution 
Act against the defendant and lost at a bench trial. The district court held that defendant 
Utah Travel Division’s use of the mark THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH did not 
dilute plaintiff Ringling’s mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH.125 The plaintiff 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit that later affirmed the district court’s decision. 
  
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit did not find the need to analyze fame.126 The Fourth 
Circuit summarily affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s mark is 
famous since over 40% of respondents in the United States, both inside and outside of 
Utah, were able to complete the incomplete phrase THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH 
with the word SHOW and to associate that mark with the Ringling Circus, thus finding that 
the plaintiff’s mark is famous.127 
  
                                                             
122 See Ringling II, 955 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D.Va. 1997). 
123 See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 451. 
124 See Id. 
125 See Ringling II at 621. 
126 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999) (“At trial, Ringling put on essentially undisputed 
evidence demonstrating that its mark had achieved ‘famous’ status before Utah began use 
of its mark. This left as the dispositive issue whether Utah’s mark had ‘diluted’ Ringling’s 
by ‘blurring’ it.”) 
127 The survey results in Utah were 
(i) 25% of respondents completed the statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH 
with only the word SHOW and associated the completed statement with the Circus; (ii) 
24% completed that statement with only the word SNOW and associated the completed 
statement with [defendant]; and (iii) 21% of respondents completed that statement with 
SHOW and associated the result with the Circus and also completed this statement with 
SNOW and associated the completed statement with [defendant]. So in Utah, a total of 
46% of respondents completed the statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH with 
the word SHOW and associated the completed statement with the Circus, and a total of 
45% of respondents completed that statement with the word SNOW and associated the 
completed statement with [defendant]. 
Ringling II, 955 F. Supp. at 612-3 n.4. 
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*181 The Fourth Circuit devoted most of its opinion on the dilution analysis. It 
examined state dilution statutes, the Dilution Act and its legislative history.128 It observed 
that unlike state statutes, which protect famous marks from future harm, the Dilution Act 
protects a famous mark from actual economic harm inflicted on the former selling power of 
the famous mark by defendant’s use of the junior mark.129 The Fourth Circuit found 
support for its interpretation in the language of the Act. According to the Fourth Circuit, the 
Act requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s use of the junior mark actually causes 
dilution, as opposed to “will” or “may” cause dilution.130 In another words, the Dilution 
Act focuses on the past measurable harm and not on the future unmeasurable harm. 
  
The Fourth Circuit further held that the Dilution Act requires proof that (a) a 
defendant used a junior mark sufficiently similar to a famous mark to evoke a mental 
association of the two marks perceived by consumers who were exposed to the marks; (b) 
the famous mark suffered actual economic harm, i.e., a lessening of its former selling 
power for its products or services; and (c) the defendant’s use of the junior mark caused 
that harm.131 
  
With this new standard of dilution, the Fourth Circuit rejected the survey evidence 
presented by the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
plaintiff’s survey evidence failed to show that defendant Utah’s use of the junior mark had 
caused any actual harm to the plaintiff’s mark in the form of a lessening of that mark’s 
former capacity to identify and distinguish the plaintiff’s circus as its subject.132 The 
plaintiff contented that, within Utah, only 25% of respondents, as compared to 41% 
nationwide, associate the incomplete statement THE GREATEST _____ ON EARTH with 
Ringling alone because defendant’s use of its mark has caused respondents in Utah to 
associate the uses of Ringling’s and *182 defendant’s marks.133 The district court rejected 
the plaintiff’s contention because Ringling’s survey also demonstrated that 46% of 
respondents in Utah, as compared to 41% elsewhere, associated THE GREATEST SHOW 
ON EARTH with Ringling.134 Thus, no evidence in the survey demonstrated that the 
defendant’s use of THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH lessens the capacity of 
                                                             
128 Ringling, 170 F.3d at 453-461. 
129 Id. at 461. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 463. 
133 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 462-63 (4th Cir. 1999). 
134 Id. 
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plaintiff’s mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH. 135  The power of plaintiff’s 
famous mark to identify and distinguish Ringling’s circus was as strong within Utah as it 
was outside of Utah. Thus, there was no actual dilution of plaintiff’s mark.136 
  
As to proof of dilution, the Fourth Circuit in Ringling obviously misread the 
dilution law and thus misinterpreted the survey evidence of dilution. The interpretation that 
the Dilution Act requires proof of actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling 
power is contrary to a long line of jurisprudence on dilution.137 Dilution through the 
blurring theory does not require consumers in the defendant’s market to be confused or 
mistaken in their associations of famous and junior marks.138 Dilution indeed occurs if 
consumers think of both a famous and junior mark at the same time, but properly recognize 
that the two products come *183 from two different sources.139 Further, dilution is a slow 
process of whittling away the selling power of a trademark.140 
  
The Ringling court buttressed its conclusion of no dilution by pointing to the survey 
evidence establishing that respondents in Utah, the epicenter of injury to the plaintiff’s 
mark, showed a higher degree of recognition of plaintiff’s mark than respondents 
elsewhere. The Ringling court’s analysis of the survey evidence creates a nightmare for 
owners of known trademarks. If an owner establishes fame through a consumer survey, 
that finding may then be used as evidence that recognition power has not diminished, so 
there will be no finding of injury or dilution to the mark!141 
                                                             
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See Patrick Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 
70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295 (1999); Reichman, supra note 57; Melanie M. Routh, Note, 
Trademark Dilution and the Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 50 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 253 (reviewing seventeen cases that have applied the Act and concluding that courts 
have given the dilution theory a newfound respect and are more willing to recognize 
dilution as a cause of action that can stand alone); Gregg Duffey, Comment, Trademark 
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: You’ve Come a Long Way 
Baby-- Too Far, Maybe?, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev. 133, 164 (1997); Serad, supra note 61 
(discussion on “famous” and its effects on average business owners). 
138 Reichman, supra note 57; McCarthy, supra note 48, § 24 at 117-18. 
139 Reichman, supra note 57; McCarthy, supra note 48, § 24 at 117-18. 
140 McCarthy, supra note 48, § 24 at 117-18. 
141 A commentator has also criticized the Ringling decision, noting that the court 
failed to recognize that dilution “does not require consumers in the defendant’s market to 
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C. The Eighth Circuit: Luigino’s v. Stouffer Corp. 
In this case, plaintiff Stouffer has been successfully marketing its low-fat frozen 
entrees under the registered trademark LEAN CUISINE since 1978. As a competitor of the 
plaintiff in the frozen entrees market, defendant Luigino introduced its low-fat frozen 
entrees under the “Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tasty” mark in 1996. The plaintiff immediately 
requested defendant to cease using the Michelina’s Lean ‘N Tasty mark. The defendant 
refused and brought a declaratory judgment that its mark did not dilute the LEAN 
CUISINE mark.142 The plaintiff counterclaimed for dilution.143 
  
*184 According to the Eighth Circuit, dilution occurs when consumers associate a 
famous mark that has traditionally identified the mark owner’s goods with a new and 
different source.144 By causing consumers to associate the famous mark with different 
goods, the junior mark weakens the famous mark’s unique and distinctive connection to a 
particular product.vThus, to establish a trademark dilution claim, the plaintiff must show 
that (a) its LEAN CUISINE mark is famous; (b) the defendant began using a similar mark 
after the LEAN CUISINE mark became famous; and (c) the defendant’s mark dilutes the 
distinctive quality of the LEAN CUISINE mark by causing consumers to connect the 
LEAN CUISINE mark with different products.145 Since the defendant conceded that the 
plaintiff’s LEAN CUISINE mark is famous, the Eighth Circuit focused its attention on 
“similarity and dilution.”146 
  
The Eighth Circuit noted that the two marks are not similar enough to support an 
action for dilution by blurring.147 The Eighth Circuit’s requirement that the marks be 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
be confused or mistaken in their associations. Dilution occurs if a consumer thinks of both 
marks at the same time and properly recognizes that the mark identifies two sources.” 
Thus, based on its misreading of dilution law, the Ringling court misinterpreted the survey 
evidence on dilution. Reichman, supra note 57, at 134-35. 
142 Luigino’s v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1999). Defendant 
Luigino also sought a declaratory judgment that its mark did not infringe on the LEAN 
CUISINE mark. 
143 Plaintiff also counter-claimed for infringement. Id. 
144 Id. at 832. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
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similar is at odds with the plain language of the Dilution Act, which does not require that 
the junior mark be similar to the famous mark.148 The Eighth Circuit drew its support for 
its requirement from Professor McCarthy who has suggested that the junior mark and the 
famous mark must “at least be similar enough that a significant segment of the target group 
of customers sees the two marks as essentially the same.”149 
  
As to the dilution issue, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that dilution 
occurs because consumers associate both marks with tasty, low-fat frozen entrees.150 The 
plaintiff’s argument, the court stated, is contrary to trademark law, which does not give the 
plaintiff the exclusive right to use a mark that consumers associate with tasty, low-fat 
frozen entrees.151 The court held that to succeed on a  *185 dilution claim, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendant’s mark causes consumers toaassociate the LEAN 
CUISINE mark with something other than plaintiff’s frozen entrees. Since the plaintiff 
failed to offer such evidence for its dilution claim, summary judgment in the defendant’s 
favor was affirmed.152 
  
The Eighth Circuit’s standard for determining dilution is markedly different from 
the First Circuit’s and Fourth Circuit’s. The Eighth Circuit requires that the plaintiff 
demonstrate that the defendant’s mark is causing consumers to associate the famous mark 
with something other than its own products. This test is different from the First Circuit’s 
test to see if the target customers perceive the plaintiff’s product and the defendant’s 
product as the same. The Eighth Circuit’s standard is also different from the Fourth 
Circuit’s requirement of a showing of actual economic harm to the famous mark’s selling 
power due to the defendant’s use of the junior mark. 
  
The standard adopted by the Eighth Circuit to determine dilution is consistent with 
the theory of dilution through blurring which Professor Schechter formulated in 1927.153 
Dilution through blurring occurs when a customer is exposed to the junior mark, 
remembers the famous mark, and associates the famous mark with the new products or 
services that bear the junior mark. The Eighth Circuit decision, however, failed to explain 
how and what kind of evidence a plaintiff should offer to demonstrate that the defendant’s 
                                                             
148 See Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1996). 
149 McCarthy, supra note 48, § 24:90.1 at 24-145. 
150 Luigino’s v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 833 (8th Cir. 1999). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. 
L. Rev. 813, 832 (1927). 
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mark causes consumers to associate the famous mark with different products. It does not 
clarify in the language of the decision whether actual dilution or likelihood of dilution must 
be shown, nor the degree of dilution a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to prevail. The 
Eighth Circuit’s silence on these issues just keeps the circus spinning so fast that the 
audience and performers are all dizzy. 
  
D. The Ninth Circuit: Panavision International v. Toeppen 
This case involved an Internet domain name dispute. Plaintiff Panavision is the 
owner of the trademark PANAVISION for motion picture camera equipment.154 Plaintiff 
attempted to register panavision.com as a domain name but could not *186 because 
defendant Toeppen had already established a website with such name. 155  Defendant 
Toeppen was in the business of registering domain names of companies such as Delta 
Airlines, Neiman Marcus, and Eddie Bauer and subsequently offering to sell the domain 
names back to the respective company. 156  The defendant offered to sell the 
Panavision.com domain name to plaintiff for $13,000.157 The plaintiff refused and brought 
an anti-dilution claim against defendant. 
  
The Ninth Circuit examined the language of the Dilution Act and its legislative 
history, finding the traditional theories of dilution through blurring and tarnishment 
inapplicable to the Internet domain name dispute. 158  The court ignored the fame 
requirement and proceeded to analyze dilution of a trademark in the Internet context.159 
The court found that the legislative intent of the Dilution Act was clearly aimed at 
stemming the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who choose marks that are 
associated with the products and reputations of others.160 Thus, dilution occurred in the 
Internet case where the defendant’s conduct diminished the capacity of the Panavision 
mark to identify and distinguish Panavision’s goods and services on the Internet. 161 
Indeed, because of the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s trademark as a domain name, the 
                                                             
154 Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1325. 
159 Id. 
160 Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998). 
161 Id. 
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plaintiff’s potential customers are discouraged if they cannot quickly locate the Internet 
site for Panavision because Panavision.com is being used by the defendant, and as a result 
potential customers would have to wade through hundreds of web sites to find the real site. 
The defendant’s conduct is holding the plaintiff’s Panavision mark and reputation 
hostage.162 The Ninth Circuit concluded that defendant’s registration of *187 plaintiff’s 
Panavision mark as its domain name on the Internet diluted that mark within the meaning 
of the Dilution Act.163 
  
The Ninth Circuit decision adds a different twist to the interpretation of the Dilution 
Act. As noted above, the court completely ignored the fame analysis.164 Had the court 
engaged in the fame analysis examining the factors listed in the subsection (c)(1) of the 
Dilution Act, the court could not have concluded that “Panavision” is a famous mark 
within the meaning of the Dilution Act. The Ninth Circuit apparently interpreted 
congressional intent to hold that the Dilution Act prohibits the use of domain names taken 
by those who deliberately chose domain names that are similar to trademarks belonging to 
others. Indeed, as justification for its finding of dilution, the Ninth Circuit quoted Senator 
Patrick Leahy’s statement that trademark dilution on the Internet was a matter of 
congressional concern.165 In so doing, the Ninth Circuit ignored the fame analysis under 
the Act. The danger in a blanket application of the Dilution Act to the Internet without 
engaging in the fame analysis raises potential problems of according undeserving marks on 
the Internet the famous status while refusing the more deserving marks the same status. 
Thus, some marks that should not be entitled to federal anti-dilution protection get the 
protection merely because these marks have been used as domain names without 
permission of the trademark owners. 
  
V. The Fun at the Circus is over 
                                                             
162 Id. at 1327. 
163 Id. 
164 Several district courts have made the similar mistake of ignoring the fame 
analysis. As a result, these courts found certain marks famous under the Dilution Act when 
in fact these marks are only known either in a small geographical area or in a small market 
niche. See, e.g., Gazette Newpapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 
1996); Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995 (S.D. Fla. 
1997). 
165 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt) stated, “It is my hope that this anti-dilution statute 
can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing 
marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others.” 141 Cong. Rec. 
S19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy), quoted in Panavision, 141 
F.3d at 1326. 
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*188 The conflicting rulings from various appellate courts on the application and 
interpretation of the Dilution Act will spin trademark owners and practitioners in different 
directions. The hope for a more uniform dilution law has been shattered by inharmonious 
and fragmented interpretations of the Dilution Act from appellate courts. 
  
At the present time, a number of federal circuit courts have had the opportunity to 
address the Dilution Act, and each has a different interpretation. As demonstrated above, 
the First and Fourth Circuits’ standards to determine dilution are 180 degrees apart. The 
First Circuit rejects the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant’s use of the junior mark lessens the demand for products or services 
bearing the famous mark. The First Circuit, instead imposes a test of whether the target 
customers would perceive the plaintiff’s products and defendant’s products as essentially 
the same. The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the defendant’s use of the junior mark has caused the famous mark actual economic harm, 
i.e., the famous mark’s selling power is less than what it was prior to the defendant’s use of 
the junior mark. The Eighth Circuit articulates a third standard: it requires the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant’s use of the junior mark is causing consumers to associate the 
famous mark with something other than its own products. The Ninth Circuit interprets the 
Act to address congressional concern on trademark use on the Internet. The Ninth Circuit 
ignores the fame analysis altogether and fashions a new dilution theory of diminishment. 
Under this theory, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that the defendant’s use of the 
trademark is discouraging the plaintiff’s potential customers from surfing the web to get to 
the plaintiff’s site. The customers may have to wade through hundreds of sites before they 
reach the plaintiff’s site since the defendant occupies the obvious site name. 
  
Moving towards a more harmonious and uniform interpretation of the Dilution Act 
requires the courts to acknowledge from the outset that only truly famous marks are 
entitled to federal anti-dilution protection. The fame analysis is critical to the overall 
dilution analysis. By engaging in vigorous review of whether a mark has achieved fame 
and distinctiveness as required by the Dilution Act, courts will eliminate the potential 
problem of protecting non-famous, and thus undeserving, marks, which are known only in 
small market niches or limited geographical areas. The starting point of analyzing fame is 
the list of eight factors in subsection (c)(1) of section 43 of the Lanham Act. 
  
After determining whether a mark is famous within the meaning of the Dilution 
Act, the courts need to determine the appropriate standard for ascertaining whether a 
famous mark is diluted and the degree of dilution. Again, the starting point for a dilution 
analysis is the language of the Dilution Act itself, which provides federal protection to 
owners of famous marks against “another person’s commercial *189 use in commerce of a 
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous mark.”166 The Dilution Act defines dilution 
                                                             
166 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 
(1996); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
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as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence of absence of (1) competition between the owner of the 
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”167 
Most courts seem to disagree on the definition of dilution and how to demonstrate dilution. 
  
Though legislative history of the Dilution Act and the language of the Act itself fail 
to provide any examples of dilution through blurring that causes “the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,” courts should 
recognize that dilution through blurring is a slow process. To require a plaintiff to show 
actual economic harm suffered by the famous mark is unreasonable, if not impossible. 
Such proof would require owners of famous marks to wait until they could quantify the 
actual economic harm to the famous mark. By that time it is probably too late for the owner 
to get a preliminary injunction, or worse: the defendant may use laches and numerous third 
party use as defenses. A likelihood of dilution standard would be more realistic a test for 
the plaintiff to demonstrate. Likelihood of dilution can be shown through consumer survey 
evidence that follows acceptable criteria of survey research. Additionally, since the 
language of the Dilution Act does not require owners of famous marks to show source 
confusion, courts should avoid imposing the “source confusion” test such as the First 
Circuit did when requiring that the plaintiff in a dilution claim to demonstrate that the 
products were perceived by target customers as essentially the same. 
  
As to product design marks, courts should not dodge the issues: non-functional 
product design marks are entitled to federal anti-dilution protection just as word marks 
would be. As long as a product design mark meets (1) all the criteria of a trademark, i.e., 
the product design is inherently distinctive, identifies source, and is non-functional; and (2) 
all the criteria of a famous mark as listed in subsection (c)(1), it is then entitled to the 
anti-dilution protection under the Dilution Act. The dilution analysis should then proceed 
as in any other cases involving famous marks. Step 1 would ensure that the conflict 
between patent and trademark laws is resolved by only providing trademark protection for 
product designs that are inherently distinctive, act like source identifiers and are 
non-functional. Step 2 would ensure that only famous product design marks are entitled to 
federal anti-dilution *190 protection. This would put to rest concerns relating to perpetual 
patent-like protection for product designs. These steps involve vigorous analyses, and most 
likely, very few product designs could pass muster. 
 
V. Conclusion 
With the discrepancies and inconsistencies among the standards employed by the 
various circuits, if a more uniform approach to dilution is not soon reached, forum 
shopping is unavoidable. Trademark owners would seek district courts in a circuit that has 
a more lenient requirement for proof of dilution. If the conflict among the Circuits is 
                                                             
167 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
Copyright © Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
 
1 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 158 
 
irreconcilable, it may be time for the Supreme Court or Congress to clarify the appropriate 
standard of determining dilution. 
